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SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN THE
NORTH AND WEST: LEGAL ASPECTS
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
The purpose of this study is to examine the legal aspects re-
sulting from segregation in the schools where the schools had not
previously been segregated on the basis of race prior to the de-
cision in Brown v. Board of Education1 or where they have been
officially desegregated since Brown. It is a matter of common
knowledge that residential patterns often fall on racial lines; this
coupled with other factors may result in actual segregation by
race.2 This paper will deal with the legal questions presented in
such a situation.
Preliminary Considerations
Our concern is with actual racial segregation in the schools
riot required or sanctioned by positive law, that is, legislation. 3
In the areas where such segregation was required or sanctioned
Iy legislation, the cases are controlled by the Brown decision and
(,he remedies prescribed by the second Brown case.4 Districts that
have failed to change their policies are ordered to do so "with all
deliberate speed." In the situation dealt with in this paper legis-
lation does not require a policy of segregation, but for one reason
or another segregation exists in fact. There has been unfortunate
confusion in the use of the terms, "de jure" and "de facto"
segregation. One way of defining "de facto" segregation would
be as the opposite of "de jure," namely segregation not required
or sanctioned by legislation, literally segregation in fact. This
would include the situations where segregation is maintained by
board policy as evidenced, for example, by "gerrymandering" of
school districts or is the result of racial concentration when the
*Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. For graphic illustration as to the extent of actual segregation in a city like
New York see, American Jewish Congress, From Color Blind to Color Conscious
7-9 (1959).
3. The constitutional inhibition extends to legislation permitting segregation
(and hence approving it as state policy where the state is regulating) as well as that
requiring it. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914) (permitting
railroads to deny equal dining facilities to Negroes).
4. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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board employs the neighborhood school policy without intention
to maintain a policy of segregation.
However, there has been the belief that unless the segregation
is labelled, "de jure," it raises no legal questions.5 As a result
"de jure" has been defined as "segregation created or maintained
by official act, regardless of its form."6 Because of the confusion
resulting from their use and the fact that these terms represent.
incomplete and imprecise explanations, they will not be used.
For purpose of analysis, we will draw the distinction between
segregation required or sanctioned by positive law and segrega-
tion not required or sanctioned by positive law. This is not to
say that the latter does not raise many legal questions, but merely
that those legal questions lend themselves to a different solution
and analysis than those that exist when segregation is required or
sanctioned by legislation.
Another source of confusion here has been the intimation that
the question is one of state action as that term has been tradi-
tionally understood.7 Here the state action is the operation of
the public schools and/or compelling attendance at such schools.
Questions of what is state action arise in basically two situations.
The first is whether the action of the particular state official or
agency can be deemed the action of the state in the particular
instance. This may arise where the acts of the state official were
illegal under state" law or where acts of the judicial arm in en-
forcing private arrangements violate the constitutional rights of
those adversely affected by those arrangements.9 There is no
question that school officials are acting as the state; hence their
action is state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.10
5. See, e.g., 1961 Education, United States Commission on Civil Rights 100.
6. Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), aff'd., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
7. See e.g., the reference to "expanding concept of state action" in reference to
the New Rochelle case in Moslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 VILL.L.
REv. 353, 358 (1961).
8. Monroe v. Papp, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (illegal search in violation of Fourteenth
Amendment also prohibited by state law; action of official constituted state action).
9. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (19-8) (court's enforcement of restrictive racial
convenant constitutes forbidden state action). Cf. Black v. Cutter Laboratories.
351 U.S. 292 (1956) (court's enforcement of collective bargaining agreement allow-
ing discharge of employee for just cause defined as including membership in the
communist party did not constitute state action denying freedom of expression).
10. This point has been assumed beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The second is where action by private persons is deemed to be
equivalent to be actions of the state because of the circumstances
in which they are acting. Thus, political parties," proprietors
of a company owned town,12 and lessees of governmental prop-
erty, 3 have been deemed to be acting as the state in certain situa-
tions.
In the area of actual school segregation the question is not
whether segregation is due to the acts of private persons or is due
to the state.' 4 The question is under what circumstances the
state action in operating the public schools on a factually segre-
gated basis violates the constitutional rights of minorities such
as Negroes, even though such segregation is not required or
sanctioned by positive law. This point was recognized by the
court in Branche v. Board of Education of Hempstead,15 where
the court observed that the educational system was publicly af-
forded and compulsory; therefore, it refused the board's motion
[or summary judgment despite the board's claim that it was not
responsible for the racial segregation that existed in the schools.
Some courts, however, seem to proceed on the premise that
it must be the state action that causes the segregation in order
lor a constitutional question to arise and talk in terms of the
issue being one of state action in the traditional sense. For ex-
ample, in Henry v. Godsell, 6 the court refused to enjoin the
building of a school in a certain location, even though the effect
would be to cause the school population to be entirely Negro; in
Holland v. Board of Education of Palm Beach," the .court held
that a complaint alleging racial segregation should not have been
dismissed despite the board's claim that actual segregation was
the result of neighborhood residential patterns, where neighbor-
hoods were unconstitutionally segregated racially. The court in
In re Skipwith, 8 distinguished these cases on-the ground that in
the Godsell case the segregation was the result of private action
11. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Rice v: Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1948), cert.denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
12. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
13. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14. As Shelley indicates, the state may not directly make acts of private persons
in discriminating effective. It reinforces such acts, however, when it insures that if
private persons are able to keep the neighborhoods residentially segregated, the
state will do so in the operation of its schools.
15. 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
16. 165 F. Supp 87 (E.DMich. 1958).
17. 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958).
18. 14 Misc.2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 8.2 (1958).
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and in Holland it was the result of the state action in zoning the
neighborhoods racially. This ignores the fact that in both cases
state action was present in the form of the board's o)pcration of the
schools. The action challenged was the state's o)pcration of the
schools, not the action of a private person in discmimiating. The
same type of reasoning is found in the language ohI the court in
Borders v. Rippey,19 observing that "the equal protection and
due process clauses forbid any state action requiring segregation
on account of race." This type of language is risleading, as it
could indicate the problem is to be viewed in teruis oh' the private
action-state action distinction, which is inapplicable due to the
fact that the state is acting in its operation of the schools. The
question then is not one of state action, but when the state's
operation of the schools in such a manner resulting in racial segre-
gation offends the due process and equal protection clauses even
in the absence of legislation requiring or sanctioning racial segre-
gation.20 This is not to say that analogies to the question of what
is state action may not be relevant in determining whether the
board has acted unconstitutionally, but that the question should
not be treated as one of state-created or privately-created segrega-
tion.
Next it is necessary to consider the holding in Brown v. Board
of Education,21 and the ratio decidendi of that case. The holding
-defined in its relation to stare decisis as that portion of the
decision which the court must follow or overrule in the future-
was that compulsory segregation in the public schools dite to the
requirements or sanction of positive law violated the rights of
Negro pupils to equal protection. In the companion case of
Boiling v. Sharpe,2" it was held that compulsory segregation under
those circumstances likewise was a denial of liberty without due
process.
More significant was the ratio decidendi of the case to the effect
that segregation in the publicly operated schools causes feelings
of inferiority due to race and denies equal educational oppor-
tunities by preventing contact with white students. By the same
19. 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957).
20. Of course, this means state inaction as well when the state's failure to act
causes harm it is required to prevent. See the discussion in Hankin, Shelley v.
Kramer: Notes for a Revised Opinion. 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 481 (1962). See also
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926) (Unreasonable delay ill
determining new utility rates).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
232 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
token, racial classification serves no legitimate governmental pur-
pose, hence offending the due process clause. The corollaries of
Brown23 furnish the rationale that racial segregation in any gov-
ernmentally operated facility is harmful to the minority race
and thus constitutes an unreasonable classification.
As a result of Brown there are two aspects to the denial of
equal protection due to race. Prior to Brown it was well estab-
lished that a state could not deny a benefit to a person because
of his race. Examples of this would include the right to be tried
by a jury on which members of his race had an opportunity to
serve, 24 the right to vote,25 the right to use property,2 6 and fa-
cilities equal to that furnished the other race. 7
By destroying the concept of separate but equal the court recog-
nized that segregation was segregation against the Negro and not
mutual segregation between Negroes and whites. As a result the
facilities were inherently unequal, because such segregation
caused the Negro to suffer feelings of inferiority due to 'his race
and denied him the opportunity for sharing educational expe-
riences with the members of the other race. The inhibiting
effect on the learning process was clear. Since compulsory segre-
gation in the schools had these effects, it was unconstitutional;
moreover, such segregation was not necessary to accomplish any
legitimate governmental objective. The corollaries extend the
principle to any governmentally operated facility, which is sound,
since the government cannot cause feelings of inferiority due to
race nor deny the opportunity for contact with the predominant
race-the rationale in Brown. If the state then operates any
activity in such a way as to cause feelings of inferiority due to
race and the denial of contact, the rationale in Brown would
indicate that the state might be acting unconstitutionally, even
though the means by which such harm was done involved methods
other than compulsory racial segregation.
23. See also the following cases where the Court voided segregation in per curiam
opinions in reliance on Brown: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877" (1956) (public bathing beach); Holmes v. City of Atlanta. 350 U.S. 879
(1956) (public golf course).
24. Strauder v. Wvest Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
25. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
26 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 167 (1961). As to the unconstitutionality of
racial zoning of neighborhoods see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), and
Monk v. City of Birmingham, 185 F.2d (5th Cir. 1951).
27. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). See also Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (need for equal opportunities in legal education re-
quires attendance at same law school with whites).
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In summary, it must be recognized that (1) state action exists
by the fact of operation of the public schools and (2) the rationale
of Brown is that if a state causes feelings of inferiority due to race
and denies opportunity for contact, questions as to the consti-
tutionality of such action arise. Compulsory segregation required
or permitted by legislation is but one way of accomplishing the
wrong.
Constitutional Problems Raised by Actual Segregation
in Schools Not Required or Sanctioned by Positive Law
UNEQUAL FACILITIES
Evidence indicates that where there is actual segregation,
though not required or sanctioned by positive law, often the
schools in which the members of the minority race predominate
tend to be inferior in various respects relating to the quality of
education furnished. Some of these include the pupil-teacher
ratio, qualifications of teachers, course of study offered and phys-
ical facilities.28 The question is posed as to the extent to which
unequal educational facilities existing in fact though not because
of separate schools on a racial basis are unconstitutional.
Obviously there must be some degree of equality in the quality
of education furnished by the state; as there must be in any benefit
the state chooses to provide.2 Where children cannot transfer
from one school to another, they should not be forced to accept
an inferior education when the state has chosen to provide it
based on the happenstance of the school to which they are as-
signed. Just as obviously every school cannot be substantially as
good as every other school in the system.
Under the separate but equal concept, however, the Negro
schools did have to be substantially as good as the white schools.
Otherwise there would be a denial of a tangible benefit based
on race and the principles in the jury exclusion or the voting
rights or the use of property cases would be applicable."0 Since
the state had chosen to classify because of race, such classification
was justifiable only where no denial of tangible benefit would
28. See 1961 Education, United States Commission on Civil Rights 115; Public
Education Association Report on the Status of the Public School Education of Negro
and Puerto Rican Children in New York City 7-13 (1955).
29. As to education itself the state cannot offer only some children education by
closing districts where integration has been ordered. James v. Almond, 170 F.Snpp.
331 (E.D.Va. 1959).
30. Supra, notes 11, 12 and 13.
234 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
result. 31 In our situation, assuming the state has not chosen to
classify on racial grounds, the principles developed under the
separate but equal doctrine are inapplicable.
At the same time it should be noted that state courts have
insisted that school boards furnish the pupils in their district
substantially the same quality of education. Thus where the
school board, which was required to educate pupils who did not
pay tuition, put those pupils in a separate room and furnished
only a first grade teacher, though many students were in a higher
grade, the court enjoined this practice as a matter of state law.
3 2
Where the board closed a high school in one section of the
county, sending the children by bus to a school in an adjoining
county, and put most of the revenues into improving the school
in the other section of the county, the board was ordered to re-
open the school it had closed and insure that the quality of edu-
cation was substantially the same in both schools.33 This concept
of equality is to some extent carried over into the equal protec-
tion clause, though the standards are not the same because of the
fatitude afforded to the state under the equal protection clause
when the use of facilities was not based on race.
34
It.may be~asked.at.-this juncture..of what significance it is that
the inferior schools are predominantly populated by a racial
minority. This brings us to a consideration of In re Skipwith, 5
which involved a prosecution for child neglect due to the failure
of the parents to send their children to scklel as required by law.
The defense was that the children, Negroes, were required to
attend a school where all the students were Negro or Puerto
Rican. Moreover, it was alleged that schools in which the Negro
and Puerto Rican pupils predominated were deficient both in
terms of physical plant and quality of instruction furnished. The
court permitted the defendants to raise the question of the chil-
31. See an interesting discussion of this question applicable to Skipworth in Note,
107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1053 (1959). The author's worry about New York City's teacher
problems seems a bit-excessive.
32. Moore v. Brinson, 170 Ga. 680, 154 S. E. 141 (1930). This was based on the
constitutional provision requiring a free education in the public schools.
33. Wooley v. Spalding, 293 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1956). There was a religious aspect
to this case, as the county was divided on religious lines and the board favored the
school serving the majority religion.
34. As to the state's latitude in classification for equal protection purposes see
the discussion, infra, note 142 and accompanying text.
35. 14 Misc.2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1958).
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dren's constitutional rights.3 6 It found that the fact that all the
children were Negro or Puerto Rican was not per se a denial
of equal protection and that the board did not havc a policy of
racial segregation.
In determining the quality of education it looked nt at the
school in question compared to other schools in the systcili, but
at the schools in which Negroes and Puerto Ricans predoirinated
compared to those where they did not. It adopted the classifica-
tion of X and Y schools, 7 X being an elementary school where
the Negro and Puerto Rican population was 90% or a junior
high school where such population was 85% or more. The ele-
mentary and junior high schools were established on a neighbor-
hood basis. It found a number of inequalities in physical fa-
cilities, class size and the like, but the most glaring defect was
that the X schools had a substantially higher proportion of un-
licensed teachers than the Y schools. This resulted from the
board's policy of permitting teachers to choose their own schools,
more specifically, to refuse assignment to a particular school
while retaining their eligibility. Naturally, many refused to
teach in the slum neighborhoods, largely inhabited by Negroes
and Puerto Ricans. The inferior education furnished was found
to be a denial of equal protection to the students in the X schools
and therefore the parents were justified in refusing to send the
children to such schools.
38
The approach taken by the court would indicate where there
is actual segregation though not due to the policy of the board,
the pre-Brown test is applicable. The court looks to the ".non-
white" schools as a whole and determines whether in fact the
children attending them are receiving the same quality of edu-
cation as the children attending white schools.39
It is submitted that where, as here, the court found no policy
36. We are not concerned here with whether the unequal facilities should be a
defense to prosecution for failure to obey compulsory attendance laws. As the later
discussion will indicate, we are assuming that the state can require the child to
attend school despite unequal facilities or actual segregation. The more desirable
action on the part of disaffected parents would be a suit for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief so as to eliminate the harm.
37. This was based on the Public Education Association Report, supra, note 28.
38. Accord: Dobbins v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 697, 96 S.E.2d 154 (1956). where
the inferiority of the Negro school was asserted as a defense. The board had riot
desegregated and the child had been refused admittance to the white school beCIusc
of his race. The court emphasized, however, the inferiority of the Negro school.
39. For a discussion of the legal approach to the rights of Negroes as a "giol"
see Greenberg, Race Relations and Group Interests in the Law, 13 Rutgers .. Jecv.
503, 504 (1959).
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of segregation such an approach is questionable. Unequal fa-
cilities in the schools where members of the minority race pre-
dominate may be strong evidence of a policy of segregation. If
so, as will be discussed in the next section, this policy is in itself
unconstitutional. Moreover, if the board, though it does not
have a policy of segregation, denies equal facilities to the schools
on racial grounds, this is unconstitutional in the traditional sense,
since benefits have been denied to persons because of their race.
40
A sounder explanation of Skipworth on racial grounds is closer
to the latter situation. The board permitted the teachers, agents
of the state, to choose their assignments and the evidence was that
they made the choice in part at least, on racial grounds. The
board had the power to prevent their agents from discriminating
by adopting a method of teacher assignment that prohibited such
action. That this was a motivating factor in the court's decision
is indicated by the following language:
"That the Board of Education is entirely responsible for the
existing. discrimination in teacher assignments, there is, in my
opinion, not the slightest doubt. What the Board did was to let
the teachers themselves establish the discriminatory pattern. But
this was action by the Board's employees, and action by em-
ployees, who, regularly licensed teachers, were subject to such
assignments as the Board chose to make. Having put the power
of assignment in the hands of the teachers by default, as far as
their choosing or not choosing to teach in an 'X' school-a
euphemism which nowise changes the fact of de facto school
segregation-the Board is bound by the acts of its servants.
'41
The Court's analogy to Rice V. Elriore,42 is therefore, quite apt.
There, the state's failure to prevent private persons from dis-
criminating in the electoral process when the state had abandoned
it was held to be unconstitutional. Here the case was stronger,
as the parties discriminating were by their own position state
agents. This appears to be the real basis of the decision. These
children were denied the opportunity to be taught by qualified
teachers because of their race. Even though separate schools were
not required by positive law, the teachers took advantage of the
40. The rationale is the same as where segregated schools are required, since in
that situation the board is charged with the duty to provide equal facilities.
41. 180 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
42. 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1948), cert denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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fact that the schools were in fact segregated to refuse their services
and the board which operated such schools permitted its agent to
deny an equal education to those children because of their race.
This explanation of Skipworth leaves unanswered the basic
question-assuming that there is no evidence that decisions as to
the quality of education were based on race, when does actual
inequality of educational facilities deny equal protection. The
pre-Brown tests are inapplicable, because there is no requirement
of separate facilities due to race. Rather, the children are denied
equality due to the fact that they are required to attend a par-
ticular school that does not measure up to the quality of other
schools in the system. How far does the equal protection clause
require equality of facilities when the students are not separated
on racial lines?
Here too, Skipworth may suggest the answer. It is to be found
by looking to the nature of the inequality and the ability of the
state to eliminate it. The inequality the court emphasized cen-
tered around the qualifications of teachers and the teacher-pupil
ratio.43 This goes to the essence of the educative process. More-
over, the board could easily eliminate such inequality by con-
trolling the assignment of teachers. The fact that there was a
teacher shortage, as the court pointed out, did not relieve the
board of its duty to insure that its teaching resources were equi-
tably distributed. In order to induce the teachers to teach at the
"X" schools, it could have provided incentives in the form of
higher salaries and the like. It is in the board's discretion what
it wishes to do, but it cannot avoid its duty to treat students at
the different schools within its jurisdiction equally and distribute
teaching resources accordingly. Of course, what constitutes actual
inequality is a question of fact and a matter of degree, as in the
pre-Brown situations. In Skipworth, the deficiency was glaring."
Another area going to the essence of the educational process is
curriculum. Let us say the board fails to furnish courses in cer-
tain schools which are necessary for the student to have in order
to be eligible for higher education. For example, it might decide
that it will not offer an academic course of study in schools in
poorer neighborhoods where only a small percentage of the stu-
43. See the Public Education Association Report, supra, note 28.
44. In the particular school only two out of the eleven mathematics teachers
were licensed, for example. In the "X" schools the percentage of unlicensed teach-
ers was 48.8%; in the "Y" schools it was 28%. As to the situation in oticr cities
see 1961 Education, supra, note 5 at 113-115.
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dents go on to college. This is clearly a denial of equal protec-
tion to a student who desires to go to college if the board does
not permit transfer to a school offering an academic curriculum.
This has been recognized in a case involving exceptions to a plan
of desegregation. In Pellett v. Board of Education of Hanford,4 5
the student's father wished him to take an academic curriculum
in order to prepare for college. None was offered at the all-Negro
school which he had been attending. The grade in which the
child was had not been desegregated under the "stair-step" ap-
proach, but the court ordered his admission to the "white" school.
The same reasoning would apply when any child was denied this
opportunity to have the same qualitative education offered to
others within the. system. This does not mean that every course
offered in one school must be offered in every other, but merely
that the state cannot offer one child an education preparing him
for college and deny another child within the school system that
same opportunity.
Another situation might be where the board has put the bulk
of- itsfunds-irr, one school irr-the district-and ."starved" the others
so. to speak, or has "starved" one. This was involved in Wooley
v. Spalding, 6 which has been discussed previously. Equal pro-
tectiorrdoes requirethe stare to treat schools within the system
substantially equal in regard to the amount expended per pupil
unless some pupils have special needs. In all these situations the
board's power to control the situation without disruption of the
school system is clear.
The area where the lack of equal facilities is least likely to be
a denial of equal protection is that of the physical plant. As a
practical matter, there will be old schools and new ones-other-
wise the board could not build one new school unless it replaced
every building. Moreover, physical facilities are not nearly as
important in the learning situation as the matter of teachers and
curriculum. Where separate schools were established on the basis
of race, there was justification for requiring substantial equality;
otherwise persons would be denied a benefit because of the state's
segregating them by race. No such consideration exists when
the state is not operating two school systems, so to speak.
Vhere unequal facilities do become significant is where this is
likely to have an adverse effect on the learning process. In Chi-
45. 184 F.Supp. 452 (D.Md. 1960).
46. 293 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1956), and supra, note 33 accompanying text.
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cago, for example, there are double shifts in some schools and
unfilled classrooms in other schools.41 Ignoring the fact ihat the
schools on double shifts are predominantly in Negro ntcighbor-
hoods and the unfilled classrooms in white, the denial o equal
facilities in such a situation can materially affect t leIcarning
process. Moreover, the board can easily remedy the harr by
bussing the children to the nearby empty classrooms. Ii smich a
situation, there has been a denial of equal protection irrescective
of any question of race.
In the event that it is found students have been deiled equal
educational opportunities the remedy should be in the discretion
of the board. It should be able either to eliminate the disparity
in the school within a reasonable time or transfer the complain-
ing student to a school where he will receive equal educational
opportunities. 48 This remedy was often employed in the pre-
Brown situation. In this manner the court minimizes its inter-
ference with the operation of the school system. The board may
adopt the course of conduct best suited to its needs while at the
same time the constitutional right of the student to equal treat-
men is fully protected.
It should be noted that state law often provides a remedy for
the denial of equal educational opportunities. This is despite the
fact that state courts give the board great discretion in the opera-
tion of the schools. The test in the state court may be less
stringent, as the requirement of equal educational opportunities
may be based on statute or a provision in the state constitution
such as one requiring the state to operate a free public school
system. In this context particularly state remedies should not be
ignored.
POLICY OF SEGREGATION
Even where segregation is not required or sanctioned by pos-
itive law, a board may, nonetheless, have a policy of segregation
with respect to the entire system or a particular school within the
system. Since the action of the board is state action, the result is
the same as if segregation were required or sanctioned by positive
law, and therefore, is unconstitutional. The problem then is to
determine when the board is maintaining a policy of segregation.
47. 1961 Education, supra, note 5 at 115.
48. We are concerned with the rights of the students as individuals irrespective
of race. The same principles would be applicable to any child denied equal educa-
tional opportunities.
240 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
In the first place, a board may not operate a system of segre-
gated schools even if it also has integrated schools and attendance
is voluntary at either. The problem has arisen in proposed de-
segregation plans. The Nashville board of education proposed a
plan by which an annual census would be taken to determine pref-
erences of parents and authorizing separate schools for members
of each race whose parents desired that they attend school only
with members of their own race. The other schools were to be
open on an integrated basis. In Kelly v. Board of Education of
Nashville,9 such a plan was invalidated. As a practical matter,
it could prevent integration if, as was expected, the great ma-
Jority of white parents would choose to have their children attend
the segregated school. As the court observed:
"It is the denial of the right to attend a non-segregated school
that violates the child's constitutional rights. It is the exclusion
from such a school that generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds -in a way, unlikely ever to be undone."50  -
The court pointed out that the doctrine of Brown applied to-
an individual school'as well as an entire system. The boar& car-
not maintain a policy of segregation in any school, even though
other schools in the system are integrated.51
Nor may the board maintain dual attendance areas based on
race, even though the effect is to have children assigned to schools
nearest their homes. This was involved in Wheeler v. City Board
of Education.52 It was immaterial that in the absence of a policy
of segregation the plan might be sustained as a "neighborhood
school" plan. The operation of dual attendance areas was un-
constitutional, because the board could not act under a policy
of segregation.
A similar plan was voided in Evans v. Buchanan.5 Under that
plan the child could attend either the school nearest his home or
the school which he attended previously. These attendance areas
would have prevented integration if the white children chose to
go to the schools they formerly attended. The court indicated
49. 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert.denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959).
50. 270 F.2d at 229.
51. Accord: Boson v. Rippey, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960); but there the court
also invalidated the transfer plan.
52. 196 F.Supp. 71 (M.D.N.C. 1961).
53. 173 F.Supp. 891 (D.Del. 1959).
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that such a plan may have been evidence that the board was con-
tinuing a policy of segregation, since the schools formerly attended
by the white students could never be integrated: the Negroes
could not go there, because they did not live closer to them
than the schools which they had been attending and had not at-
tended them previously. The effect would be to maintain those
schools as segregated, which may have been evidence of a policy
of segregation.
Further, the existence of a policy of segregation precludes the
requirement of resorting to remedies under pupil placement acts.
Often what the board has done under such a plan has been to
assign all Negroes and all whites to separate schools and then
require that the child request a transfer. Where the board has
done such acts, this is conclusive proof that a policy of segregation
exists and the remedies provided by the pupil placement acts
need not be exhausted, but the plaintiffs can enjoin the operation
of the schools on a segregated basis.5 4 The court observed in the
Gibson case that
"Unless some legally non-segregated schools are provided, there
can be no constitutional assignment of a pupil to a particular
school."
55
The policy of segregation is the basis for the decisions in the
"gerrymandering" cases. The question is not was segregation
caused by the actions of the board,5 6 but did the board have a
policy of segregation as evidenced by its actions. In a case such
as Clemons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro,17 there could be
no doubt that such a policy existed. The board had established
zones. The zone for the Lincoln school, to which all Negroes
were assigned, was divided into two separate parts, one in the
Northeast section of the district and the other in the Southeast
section. Some of the Negro plaintiffs had to pass the other schools
in order to reach the Lincoln School. The reference to "sub-
terfuge to segregate" simply means that the evidence is clear that
the board has adopted a policy of segregation. The evidence
54. See e.g., Hill v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 282 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1960):
Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 272 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1959).
55. 272 F.2d at 767.
56. See the discussion as to state action, supra, notes 7-20, and accompanying
text.
57. 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956), cert.denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
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was equally clear in l'ebb v. School District #90,8 where the
board "meandered up streets and alleys" in establishing school
districts so that all the Negro children would be in one district
and all the whites in another.
In Holland v. Board of Education of Palm Beach,59 there was
no evidence of gerrymandering, but the case indicates that a policy
of segregation can be proved in other ways. The court found
that the board employed the compulsory residential segregation
60
as a device to maintain a system of segregated schools. The fol-
lowing language is indicative of the court's conclusion:
"In light of the compulsory residential segregation of the
races by city ordinance, it is wholly unrealistic to assume that
complete segregation existing in the public schools is either
voluntary or the incidental result of valid rules not based on race.
It is not necessary to review piecemeal the district court's find-
ings of fact and conclusion of law, for the record as a whole
clearly reveals the basic fact that by whatever means accom-
plished,,a- completely segregated public school system, was and is
being maintained and enforced. No doubt that fact is well known
to all the citizens of the county, and the courts simply cannot
blot it out of their sight."' 1
The court also observed that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibited only "governmentally enforced segregation," which the
court found existed in Palm Beach.
Therefore, it is submitted that explanations of the case with
reference to the unconstitutionality of the housing ordinance as
satisfying the requirement of state action 2 are inaccurate except
as the existence of the ordinance relates to proof of the board's
policy of segregation. The case would seem to hold that when-
ever the board chooses to maintain a segregated school system, it
is acting unconstitutionally, even though in the absence of such
policy, the classification of the schools' attendance areas would be
58. 167 Kan. 395, 206 P.2d 1066 (1949). The decision was based on state law.
Segregation was not authorized in the particular district.
59. 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958).
60. This was invalid, as it was the denial of a benefit based on race. Buchanan
v. Warley. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Apparently the ordinance here had never been
challenged.
61. 258 F.2d at 732.
62. In re Skipwith 14 Misc.2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1958). See supra note 18,
the accompanying text. This explanation was-also made in Meador, Pupil Assign-
ment Plans, 45 Va. L. Rev. 517, 557 (1959).
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valid.13 It wokuld follow that if the court found a board estab-
lished a neighborhood school policy to fturther a policy of segre-
gation, as the board intended to maintain seoreoated schools, the
board's determination would be one based on a consideration
of improper factors and hence unconstitutional.
Taylor v. Board of Education of Vez Rochelle,64 also -was de-
cided on the basis that the board operated the Lincoln School
as a segregated school. The court found that prior to 1949 a
policy of gerrymandering was instituted, which led to the con-
fining of Negroes within the boundaries of the Lincoln School
district. As the Negro population movements shifted their res-
idential areas, the school lines were altered to coincide with those
shifts. Until 1949 white children were permitted to transfer from
Lincoln to other elementary schools. In 1949 the board "froze"
the districts and prohibited any transfers. In 1949 Lincoln had
become 100% Negro; at the time of suit it was 9.4% Negro.
Even assuming that since 1949 the board did not maintain a
policy of segregation (which it was found it did) , the court held
that-the maintenance of the status quo-originally based on a
policy of segregation-was invalid as constituting a continuance
of that policy. The analogy can be drawn to a continuing trespass,
which remains wrongful until abated. As the lower court ob-
served:
"Having created a segregated school, the Constitution imposed
upon the Board the duty to end segregation, in good faith, and
with all deliberate speed. It is patently clear that this obligation
has not been fulfilled."
65
Where a policy of segregation has been maintained in the past
then, the board has a duty to change the policy of segregation
created by its predecessors and its failure to do so is a denial of
equal protection.
Moreover, the court found as a fact that since 1949 the board
continued to have a policy of segregation with regard to Lincoln
School. It was noted that the board ignored the recommenda-
tions of experts which it had hired; the rebuilding of the Lincoln
63. Attendance areas cannot be based on race. Wheeler v. Board of Education,
196 F.Supp. 71 (M.D.N.C. 1961). The principle is equally applicable when at-
tendance areas have been chosen by the board on that basis.
64.191 F.Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.denied
368 U.S. 940 (1961).
65. 191 F.Supp. at 193.
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School could only have the effect of continuing racial segregation
there. The board attempted to influence the voters to approve
the proposal to rebuild Lincoln School. The court found as a
fact that the board's actions were motivated by a "purposeful
desire to perpetuate and maintain a segregated school." The
Court of Appeals referred to this as "crucial finding" and held
that it was supported by the record. It.is the second half of the
decision that relates to the board's state of mind. As in Holland,
if the court finds as a fact that the board chose a particular method
of assignment, e~g., the neighborhood school system, with the in-
tent -to operate a segregated school system, its action in doing so
is unconstitutional, because the board has a policy of segregation.
As in Holland, it was immaterial that the neighborhood school
policy would be a valid method of assignment absent the improper
intent. The lower court's reference to "acts generally lawful
becoming unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end"
is particularly apt.
New Rochelle then holds two things. First, when a policy of
segregation has been maintained in the past, it is a continuing
wrong, which a future board must eliminate. The neighborhood
school policy could not be used as "an instrument to confine
Negroes within an area artificially delineated in the first instance
by official acts." Secondly it recognizes that a policy of segrega-
tion involves unconstitutional action even if the particular action
would be valid absent such a policy. The court must examine
the purpose of the board in districting as it did, and if it finds
that the purpose of the board's action was to maintain a segre-
gated school or a segregated school system, it is acting uncon-
stitutionally. Here proof of a policy of segregation is more dif-
ficult than in the gerrymandering situation where the illegal
purpose of the board is obvious. But the underlying principle is
the same-it is illegal for a board, acting as the state, to maintain
a policy of racial segregation by whatever means in the operation
of the school system or of a particular school.
The same principle is demonstrated by the action of the court
in Henry v. Godsel 66 though there the court found as a fact
that a policy of segregation did not exist. The board built a new
school in an area where the school population was almost ex-
clusively Negro. Suit was brought by the parents of Negro
children who would be required to attend the new school, claim-
66. 165 F.Supp. 87 (E.D.Mich. 1958).
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ing that their assignment to that .school was unconstitutional.
The court found as a fact that the selection of the school site
was made in good faith and without intent to create a policy of
segregation. The court observed that seventeen out of thirty-one
schools in the district were attended by children of both races.
It also found that in the school district whites and Negroes par-
ticipated together in athletics, band, dramatics, debating, school
clubs and dances. Classes for retarded and handicapped children
were established on an integrated basis. Of course this would not
be conclusive on the question of whether the particular school
was maintained on a segregated basis; in New Rochelle, for ex-
ample, some other schools were integrated, but this did not rebut
the other evidence of the board's policy to segregate Lincoln
School. Here the court found no evidence that the choice of the
site was dictated on racial grounds. It observed that actual
segregation is not in and of itself evidence of a policy of segrega-
tion, which is true. It found no evidence of gerrymandering.
And it found that the selection of the particular site was a rea-
sonable one. It observed as follows:
"It (the board) may consider such factors in selecting sites
that it considers relevant and reasonable, and in the absence of a
showing that the standards for selection are not relevant and
reasonable and that in reality they were adopted as a sham or
subterfuge to foster segregation, or for other illegal purpose, their
use is within the administrative discretion of the school board."
67
In its approach then the court took the same line as was taken
in Clemons, Holland and New Rochelle, but on the facts found
no evidence of a policy of segregation as dictating the choice of
the particular site.
Sealy v. Department of Public Instruction,68 goes further in
.theory in saying that any action adopted with the purpose of dis-
criminating against Negro students is unconstitutional, though
there, too, the court found as a fact that there was no evidence
of a policy of discrimination. In that case there was no question
of segregation in the schools-the Negro students would be at-
tending the same school as the white students. The school district
comprised two non-continguous areas, the one having a pre-
67. 165 F.Supp. at 90.
68. 159 F.Supp. 561 (E.D.Pa. 1957), afl'd., 252 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.denied,
356 U.S. 975 (1958).
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dominantly white population and the other a predominantly
Negro population. The Negro area was much larger. The board
-consisting of all Negro members, incidentally-decided to lo-
cate the new high school in the white area. The complaint was
that the Negroes would have a further distance to travel and
that, therefore, the new school should be located in the Negro
section. The court found as a fact that the board had no intention
to discriminate against the Negroes and that if the school were
located in the white section only the students in the Negro section
would have had to be bussed there, but if it was located in the
Negro section all of the white students and many of the Negro
students would have to be bussed to school.
It is interesting to note that a plan for the reorganization of
the school district was also challenged in the suit. The plan
would have grouped together two areas which contained a pre-
dominantly Negro population even though those areas were non-
contiguous and separated by another district. The court did not
pass on this contention, because the plan was to re reconsidered
by the state and the evidence was that it was to be dropped. The
court retained jurisdiction.
The case is significant, since it recognized that a school board
cannot discriminate against a child in matters such as distance
to school because of his race. He cannot be required to attend
school at a. disadvantage because of his race, assuming the re-
quisite intention of the board could be shown. If such action
were taken with this intent, we would have a pre-Brown situation
-a person was denied benefits because of his race, and the court
recognized its applicability to the school situation.
69
These cases were cited by the lower court in New Rochelle as
authority for the proposition that where the board acts with the
intention to discriminate because of race, its action is unconstitu-
tional, though valid in absence of racial considerations. It ob-
served as follows:
"These cases clearly imply their converse: if a Board of Edu-
cation selects a school site, or otherwise operates its schools, with
a purposeful desire to segregate, or to maintain segregation, the
Constitution has been violated. (citing Clemons and Holland)
If such motivation is present, it makes no meaningful difference
69. See also State ex rel. Lewis v. Wilmington School Board, 137 Ohio St. 145,
28 N.E.2d 496 (1940), where a state court found that pupil assignment was not
based on race.
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whether the segregation involved is maintained directly through
formal separation, or indirectly, through over-rigid adherence to
artificially created boundary lines, as in the present case." 70
The basic problem here is one of proof of a policy of segrega-
tion. Where school lines have been gerrymandered-arranged on
a non-contiguous and non-compact basis with the result that a
school or schools is all Negro-or residential segregation is re-
quired or other direct action to perpetuate segregation has been
taken, as in New Rochelle, proof is not difficult. References to
affirmative actiofi by the board really relate to clarity of proof.
But the reasoning of all these cases and the holding in New
Rochelle particularly demonstrate that when the board takes
action with the intention of discriminating on grounds of race,
this policy of segregation is unconstitutional. The question is
not whether the existence of constitutional rights should be made
to depend on the state of minds of officials, 7' which will be' dis-
cussed in the next section. Rather it is that where improper pur-
pose can clearly be shown and harm to children's rights results
from the action taken pursuant to that improper purpose, the
:.tction is unconstitutional.
The next question to be considered is what remedies are avail-
i.ble where the board has practiced a policy of segregation or dis-
.irimination. The remedies must be viewed in light of the matter
;is to which the board has had a policy of segregation and what
_.ceps, if any, have been taken to eliminate it. The first situation
.s where the board has a policy of segregation throughout the
ystem or in a particular school. The board must present a de-
segregation plan. Apparently the plan must be such that, while
-he board is not required to integrate as such, white children
* annot avoid every school which Negroes are eligible to attend
v:ith the effect that complete segregation will again result. In
.'"vans v. Buchanan,2 for example, the court refused to accept
-i: satisfactory a plan by which the child could attend either the
..earest school within the district where he resided or the school
.e would have attended prior to the order. This was because all
-he Negroes lived closer to the colored school than the white
70. 191 F.Supp. at 194.
71. See the objection to the "state of mind" test in New Rochelle. 294 F.2d 47-
48 (dissenting opinion). The judge is confusing motives with intention, it would
appear.
72. 173 F.Supp. 891 (D.Del. 199.
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school and had gone there previously. By permitting the white
children to go to the school they previously had attended, the
plan could be so operated that no Negro child would have the
opportunity to attend an integrated school.
The same problem was presented in Kelley v. Board of Educa-
tion of Nashville.73 The proposed plan permitted children to
voluntarily transfer to schools previously serving members of the
other race. It also permitted transfer on the ground that the
school was attended by members of a different race. The effect
would be that Negro children could transfer to schools the whites
were attending, but the whites could then transfer to a school
where there were no Negroes. However, the court voided a pro-
vision authorizing separate schools for Negroes and whites.74 By
doing so it prevented white students from "escaping the Negroes,"
so to speak. There was no school the whites could attend that
Negroes could not enter. The court indicated that if the effect
of the plan was that Negroes were denied transfers to certain
schools designated as "white," this would be illegal. While the
administrative soundness of such a plan may be questioned, it
still was set up in such a way that some desegregation would have
to result. There were no schools that whites could attend, but
not Negroes. Theoretically, at least, each Negro child would have
the opportunity to attend an integrated school. In Boson v.
Rippey, 5 the court also voided a plan for separate schools and
also voided the transfer plan.
It has not definitely been decided in the desegregation cases
in the southern and border states whether the neighborhood
school plan would be fully acceptable as a desegregation plan
if it resulted in complete segregation. In Evans v. Buchanan,
supra, there were intimations that it might not be acceptable,
since the result would be that Negroes would never have the op-
portunity to attend an integrated school unless their parents
moved to another neighborhood. It was unnecessary to decide
the question, however, since giving the white students the op-
portunity to attend their former schools would in itself make it
unlikely that any desegregation would result, as for the Negroes,
the neighborhood and racial school were the same. The problem
may not arise too often in those states, since in many areas there
73. 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert.deptied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959).
74. 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert.denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959); and supra,
note 49 accompanying text.
75. 285 F.2d. 43 (5th Cir. 1960).
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were only two schools, or at least only, one colored school, and
some children will live closer to the school previously attended
by members of the opposite race. On the other hand, it may be
that the courts will require some integration to show that the
board has abandoned its former policy of segregation.
In New Rochelle, however, the court indicated that where a
policy of segregation had been adopted as to a particular school,
it would require that some students be given the opportunity to
attend an integrated school. The court employed the transfer
system to enable those who desired to leave Lincoln to attend
another school to te extent facilities were available. The avail-
ability of facilities was determined with a view toward the
board's present policy of maximum class size. Since Lincoln
school was "stigmatized" as a segregated school, those wishing to
escape the stigmata had to be given the opportunity to do so
to the extent other facilities were available. This is realistic, as
all children might not want to transfer.
It is interesting to note that the court did not enjoin the re-
building of the Lincoln school. This implies that if the board
chooses to operate it as an integrated school, transfers would not
be necessary. The case apparently says that there must be the
opportunity to "get out" where the board has maintained a school
as segregated. As long as this is permitted, further adherence to
the neighborhood school policy is not inconsistent with the ab-
sence of a policy of segregation. A board may return to the neigh-
borhood school policy according to the remedy prescribed by
the court only after it is clear that it has abandoned its policy of
segregation. Until a board has furnished evidence of a policy
of desegregation, it may not claim that it is the neighborhood
school policy which results in segregation.
Where the policy of segregation has been with respect to a
particular determination such as the location of a school or the
employment of the neighborhood school policy, the only remedy
would appear to be to require the board to reconsider its decision
without taking into account racial matters. It must be remem-
bered that when this theory is employed, there is no requirement
that the board choose another alternative (the possibility of such
a requirement will be discussed in the next section), merely that
it not use racial considerations in making such determinations.
This is analogous to the use of the remedy of mandamus to re-
quire the official to make an exercise of discretion without con-
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sidering improper factors, and this remedy should be employed
to require a board to make decisions on valid criteria only. Theo-
retically then, if the board arrived at the same result and the
court found it was not influenced by racial considerations, the
decision would stand, though segregation or disadvantage to the
Negro pupils would result. As a practical matter, however, the
court is unlikely to find as a fact that the board was motivated by
a policy of segregation in matters such as site selection unless it
sees that the board has chosen an obviously impartical site, which
the court concludes could have been done only with the intent
to effectuate a policy of segregation. In effect, it will be shown
that the board failed to choose a more reasonable course of action
and the only way that the board can satisfy the court that its con-
sideration was not based on improper grounds will be to choose
the more reasonable course of action.
In summary, it is suggested that it is unlikely the court will
often find a policy of segregation absent overt action, either past
or present, or unreasonable conduct which could be explained
on no other grounds than that the board is maintaining a policy
of segregation.
ACTUAL SEGREGATION DUE TO RACIAL CONCENTRATION
IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLICY OF SEGREGATION
Here we deal with the question which the court in the New
Rochelle case observed was not in issue-'"how far a public body
may save itself from constitutional constraint by mere inaction."
' 6
More specifically, we are concerned with whether a board, as-
suming good faith and the absence of a policy of segregation
can ignore racial imbalance caused by racial concentration in par-
ticular neighborhoods. May the state in the operation of its
schools ignore the fact that it is operating the schools in such a
way that children of a minority race can associate only with mem-
bers of their own race in the educative process?
Again, it should be noted that there is no question of whether
it is state action that is causing segregation. The state has acted
in operating a system of schools and/or requiring students to
attend them. The Supreme Court has characterized this action
as "perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. ' '7 In fact, the state may be educating them on a
76. 294 F.2d at 39, note 2.
77. Brown v. Board of Education, ,47 U.S, 483 at 493 (1954).
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segregated basis. The question is to what extent this is un-
constitutional in the absence of a policy of segregation.
At the outset we are met by the oft-repeated assertion that the
state has "no duty to integrate the schools."7 8 This view is ex-
emplified by the following language in Thompson v. County
School of Arlington:7 9
"It must be remembered that the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education do not compel
the mixing of the different races in the public schools. No general
reshuffling of the schools in 'any school system has been com-
manded. The order of that Court is simply that no child shall
be denied admission to a school on the basis of race or color.
Indeed just so a child is not through any form of compulsion or
pressure required to stay in a certain school or denied transfer
to another school because of his race or color, the school heads
may allow the pupil, whether white or Negro, to go to the same
school he would have attended in the absence of the ruling of the
Supreme Court."
The statement of "no duty to integrate" is true so far as it goes,
but represents a generalization rather than a sound analysis of
the Court's holding. The most accurate observation in the above
quotation is that "no general reshuffling of the schools in any
school system has been commanded." That is what is meant by
the fact that the board is not required to integrate. It does not
have to completely alter school boundaries and to insure that
every school district is mixed, even though some students will
have a great distance to travel. Of course this does not mean that
the board may riot decide to fully integrate the schools as a mat-
ter of social and educational policy; it merely means that the
holding in Brown does not require it to do so. On the other hand,
even though the state is not required to integrate fully every
school and every child, this does not mean that the state may
not have certain responsibilities to children of a minority race
while it is educating them, the failure to perform which may be
unconstitutional.
78. Holland v. Board of Education of Palm Beach, 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958);
Thompson v. Arlington School Board, 144 F.Supp. 239 (E.D.Va. 1956), afi'd., 240
F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Borders v. Rippey, 245
F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957); Meador, supra, note 62 at 523.
79. 144 F.Supp. 239 at 240 (E.D.Va. 1956), 2,10 I.2d 59 ('4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
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Next it is necessary to examine the concept of the neighbor-
hood school. Shortly after Brown commentators assumed that
this would be a proper criterion. As Professor Sutherland ob-
served:
"Classification by residential location is a perfectly acceptable
means of allotting children to schools, and where many Negro
children live in one neighborhood there are bound to be many
Negro children in the nearest school regardless of the state con-
cerned." 80
However, there is no automatic neighborhood. What constitutes
a neighborhood for school purposes depends on what the board
classifies as a neighborhood. This is particularly true is regard
to elementary schools in the cities where one school may be lo-
cated but a few blocks from another. Many children are prac-
tically as close to one school as to another. This is demonstrated
by the report of the Public Education Association in New York. 81
The board can decide that a neighborhood shall be classified as
running north and south or east and west. It decides what fringe
areas shall be included in a particular neighborhood. Where ra-
cial ghettos merge, a particular choice may result in factually
segregated schools or integrated schools. As the report pointed
out:
"We have noted that the New York City Schools are neigh-
borhood schools and that the school population, therefore, reflects
the ethnic composition of the school district. As long as the
principle of neighborhood schools persists, in the central areas
of homogeneous ethnic communities it is immaterial, from the
point of composition of the school, where school district boundary
lines are drawn. A school in the center of Harlem will be a Negro
school.
On the other hand, in fringe areas where groups of different
ethnic composition meet geographically, the individual responsi-
ble for zoning school districts is faced with these three alternatives:
1. He may select boundaries which promote ethnic separation.
2. He may ignore the ethnic composition problem.
80. Sutherland, Segregation by Race in Public Schools: Retrospect and Prospect,
20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 169, 180 (1955). For a statement by an educator endors-
ing the neighborhood school concept despite racial imbalance see Hansen, The
Role of Educators, 34 Notre Dame Law, 652, 654 (1959).
81. Supra, note 28.
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3. He may select boundaries which encourage intcgration of
ethnic groups." s2
This demonstrates that what constitutes a neighborhood is the
result of board determination and that the neighborhood policy
does not mean that children logically go to one school any more
than to another.
On the high school level what constitutes a "neighborhood
high school" is also not automatic. There are a number of high
schools in a district, let us says, and a number of elementary feeder
schools. There is the possibility that even though the elementary
schools are racially segregated, some are located in fringe areas
that could serve as feeders to one high school as conveniently as
the next. By employing certain elementary schools as feeders for
a particular high school, the high school will be racially segre-
gated. But it may 'be that if other, equally convenient, were em-
ployed as feeders, that high school would be integrated. By the
same token, so would be the other high school to which the re-
maining "fringe" feeder schools are allotted. Therefore, it is
clear that many schools could be biracial instead of uniracial
depending on how the board classifies a particular neighborhood
or how it allots feeder schools. If the board makes its selection
with a view toward establishing racial segregation, then the
principles discussed in the preceding section are applicable. Our
concern is whether the board can ignore in good faith an arrange-
ment which would result in integration without inconveniencing
the operation of the school system. Further we are concerned
with whether the board has any responsibility in the situation
where any neighborhood or feeder system it selects will result
in actual segregation because of the particular racial concentra-
tion in those areas.
The answers to these (qUestions begin with a reconsideration
of the rationale in Brown. As indicated previously,83 the Court
held that in the operation of its educational system the states can-
not adopt a policy causing feelings of inferiority due to race nor
deny the opportunity for contact with members of the other race.
Moreover such a policy serves no legitimate governmental pur-
pose and hence offends the due process clause. Compulsory seg-
regation in the operation of the schools, as in any public facility
82. Id. at pp, 14-15.
83. See the disctssion, supa, notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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operated by the state, is unconstitutional for those reasons. But
in tie operation of its school system the state may cause feelings
of inferiority due to race and deny equal educational opportu-
nities by other means than compulsory segregation. It must be
.remembered that the rationale of Brown is that the state may not
so act in the operation of its school system. A state obviously is
not prohibited from causing feelings of inferiority due to other
factors such as less ability than other students 4 or physical or
mental deficiencies.85 As with race there have been intimations
that the state may not cause feelings of inferiority due to reli-
gion. 86 In the instances of inferior ability or physical or mental
deficiencies, such feelings of inferiority may be necessary in order
for the state to educate the children in accordance with their
ability and to take account of their deficiencies. In these instances
it has been necessary for the state to place the child in special
schools in order to educate him as efficaciously.as possible. This
consideration is not present where the child suffers feelings of
inferiority due to race, and is denied the opportunity for contact
with members of the other race.
There is nothing to indicate that actual segregation is not
equally harmful to the minority child, though not required by
positive law or the board's policy. To the child the segregation
is required by the state just as effective as if due to a policy of
segregation. He is told he must go to school with members of
his own race only. He may be compelled to do this by compulsory
attendance laws or this may be the terms on which he can ob-
tain an education. The feeling of inferiority would be heightened
in fringe areas, where he sees a school nearby attended primarily
by white children. In New Rochelle the court found that the
94% Negro enrollment at Lincoln School "approximates closely
84. See, e.g., Barnard v. Shelbourne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913) (may be
assigned to special school with pupils of same level).
85. See e.g., Department of Public Welfare v. Hass, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 54 N.E.2d 215
(1958) (mental incompetent); State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Education of Artigo,
169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919) (defective vocal organs).
86. In McCullomn v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), where the Court in-
validated the use of the public school for religious instruction, the record was full
of evidence of how the plan caused feelings of inferiority in the child of the atheist
plaintiff. The concurring justices emphasized that only some religions in the area
offered programs, which resulted in "inculcating a feeling of separatism in the
children belonging to non-participating sects." 333 U.S. at 227-228. The causing
of feelings of inferiority in the Jehovah Witness children was also noted by the
concurring Justices in Barnette v. Board of Education, 219 U.S. 624, 644 (1943).
And the recent case of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), invalidating the Regents
Prayer involved children whose non-participation labelled them as "parialhs."
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the harmful conditions condemned in the Brown case."' 8 7 In Skip-
worth the court observed that "The record in this case fully sus-
tains the contention that the separation of children by race,
whether it be the result of governmental action or of private
housing segregation creates factors inimical to the full and equal
educational opportunities."8 The harmful effects of segregation
have been stated most clearly by Judge Edgerton in language
equally applicable to compulsory or actual segregation:
"Instead of serving a public purpose it (segregation) fosters
prejudice and obstructs the education of whites and negroes by
endorsing prejudice and preventing mutual acquaintance. Adults
are not restricted in their contracts to people who live in the same
block, but many children are practically restricted in their con-
tacts to children who attend the same school. The education
required for living in a cosmopolitan community and especially
for living in a humane and democratic country and promoting its
ideals, cannot be obtained on either side of a fence that separates
a more privileged majority and a less privileged minority.8 9
The need for children to associate in order to receive a mean-
ingful educational experience is further demonstrated by state
cases such as those holding that instruction of the child at home
did not satisfy the statutory requirement of "equivalent instruc-
tion," since the child did not have the opportunity of free associa-
tion with other children, 0 or voiding an establishment of a school
district which was intended to separate different ethnic groups.91
It is clear that actual segregation is no less harmful to the minor-
ity child than segregation required by statute or board policy.
The question then becomes at first glance whether it is un-
constitutional for a state to offer or require education (we will
assume that the constitutional question is the same because of
the significance or education; moreover, education is more often
compulsory than not, particularly on the elementary school level)
under such conditions as to cause children to suffer feelings of
inferiority due to their race, and to deny them contact with
87. 294 F.2d at 39. See also the reference to the Dodson report, 194 F.Supp. at
189, which also concluded that these children were suffering feelings of inferiority.
88. 180 N.Y.S.2d at 86. See also the reference to the Clark report, 180 N.Y.S.2d
at 866.
89. Dissenting in Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 32 (D.C.Cir. 1950). He contended
-that school segregation was unconstitutional.
90. Knox v. O'Brien, 7. N.J.Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (1950).
91. Wisconsin ex rel. Moreland v. Whitford, 54 %Visc. 150, 11 N.W. 424 (1882).
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children of the predominant race. Let us assume that in an inte-
grated school signs are posted saying Negroes are inferior and
an hour per day is devoted to class discussion of the inferiority of
the Negro (we will assume this cannot be or is not taught as
"scientific doctrine") . The state clearly cannot offer education
on those terms. This follows from the holding in McLaurnin v.
Oklahoma State Regents,9 2 where the Negro student was required
to sit in the classroom at a seat specified for Negroes and eat at a
special table in the cafeteria. This obvious attempt to make the
student feel inferior was unconstitutional, even though he was
attending an integrated school. 93 It may be asked whether actual
segregation does not accomplish the same result in that it makes
the child feel inferior due to his race. It is as if the board has
placed a sign on the school, "for Negroes only.
'9 4
However, the question posed need not be resolved on a
1"either-or" basis. It need not be whether the state must give the
child an education in an integrated school or forego the power
to require him to be educated. It is not contended that the state
has a "duty to integrate" in the sense that every school must be
integrated even at great expense and inconvenience. But this
does not answer the question of can the state still educate him on
an integrated basis thus providing equal educational opportu-
nities and preventing feelings of inferiority and at the same time
effectively operate its educational system.
Where a state can accomplish its object without causing inter-
ference with a recognized right, but chooses a method which,
while accomplishing the object, also interferes with that right, its
failure to choose the reasonable alternative constitutes a denial
of due process. This principle has been applied most frequently
in the area of economic regulation and free expression.
In Weaver v. Palmer,95 the legislature prohibited absolutely
the use of a material known as "shoddy" (renovated used mate-
rials) in the manufacture of bedding even when fully sterilized.
This was justified as a health measure and not one to regulate
economic competition. There was undisputed scientific evidence
that sterilized shoddy was not harmful to health. The statute
prohibited the-use of other second hand materials only if not
92. 339 U.S. 137 (1950).
93. See also the material cited in note 86, supra.
94. This phrase is borrowed from Rogers, Desegregation in the Schools. 45 Corn.
L. Q. 488, 502 (1960).
95. 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
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sterilized. It was held that the state could prevent any harm
resulting from the use of shoddy by requiring that it be sterilized.
If it adopted that method, the public health would be fully pro-
tected, but the defendant could continue the manufacture of
shoddy-a right protected by the due process clause. By adopting
the measure it did, it accomplished its purpose, but destroyed
his right. It was held that the failure to adopt the reasonable
alternative constituted "excessive regulation" and violated the
due process clause.9 6 The state prohibited when it could have
accomplished the same result by regulation.
97
The same principle was applicable in Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan,9 8 where statute fixed a maximum weight for bread, but
allowed a tolerance of only two ounces per pound. As a result
of this regulation, evidence showed that it was inipossible to manu-
facture good bread in the normal way unless the bread would be
wrapped to prevent evaporation. The practical result would have
been to prohibit the sale of unwrapped bread. The measure was
not a health measure, but was designed, according to the state,
solely to prevent short-weights:. The-Court found that this could
have been achieved through other methods equally effective which
would not have had the effect of prohibiting the sale of un-
wrapped bread and dWared the statrte unconstitutional.
Another application of the principle occurred in W. B. Worth-
ern Co. v. Thomas,99 which involved a statute exempting pro-
ceeds of life insurance policies from execution. The statute ap-
plied retroactively to policies issued prior to its enactment. The
statute was enacted during the depression, and it was argued that
the purpose was to give relief to debtors, relying on the fact the
Court had previously upheld a mortgage moratorium statute.'
The Court found that the statute was not limited to accomplish-
ing the result of protecting needy debtors, since there was no
limitation as to amount, however large, nor beneficiaries, nor
relationships. Most importantly it was not limited in time and
would continue even after the need had passed. Considering all
96. In analyzing a due process issue the following questions should be asked: (1)
what is the purpose of the regulation; (2) does the regulation bear a reasonable
relationship to the accomplishment of the purpose; (3) could the state have accom-
plished its purpose by action not interfering with the right asserted.
97. Accord: Lisichin v. Andrews, 26 F.Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (prohibited the
use of any second-hand materials in manufacture of bedding).
9S. 264 U.S. 504 (1924). Holmes and Brandeis dissenting, agreed as to the prin-
ciple, but disagreed as to its application in the instant case.
99. 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
100. Home Building L Ioan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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these factors, the Court concluded that needy debtors could have
been protected without destroying the rights of all past judgment
creditors and that the state's failure to employ a rcasonable alter-
native violated the due process rights of the credilors.
In the free expression area the leading case ivolving excess
regulation is Schneider v. State, 1' where a municipal ordinance
prohibited distribution of handbills in house solicitation or in
the streets. The ordinance was applied to one distributing reli-
gious literature. The city contended that the ordinance was
necessary to prevent littering in the streets and fraudulent appeals
to householders. The Court invalidated the ordinance on the
ground that the city could find other ways to prevent such harm
without destroying the opportunity to disseminate religious in-
formation. As to the prevention of street littering -the reasonable
alternative would have been to punish those who threw papers
on the street; this would have accomplished the city's purpose
without destroying the recognized right of the distributor.
In reply to the city's argument that such prohibition was neces-
sary to prevent fraudulent appeals, the Court held that the city
could accomplish the same result by punishing the fraud; in that
way the rights of the innocent disseminator could be fully pro-
tected while the state's object was accomplished. The Court ob-
served as f6llows:
"Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law.
Trespasses may similarly be forbidden. If it is said that these
means are less efficient and convenient than bestowal of power
on police authorities to decide what information may be dissemi-
nated from house to house, and who may impart the information,
the answer is that considerations of this sort do not empower a
municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press."'0 2
The city's failure to employ reasonable alternatives which would
have enabled it to accomplish its object without destroying the
rights of disseminators invalidated the action.
Of like import is Talley v. California 3 where the ordinance
prohibited the dissemination of any handbill that did not list
the name and address of the sponsor. It was argued by the city
that the ordinance was designed to identify those responsible for
101. 308 U.S. 141 (1939).
102. Schneider v. State. 308 U.S. 141, 161-165 (1939).
103. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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fraud, false advertising and libel. But the ordinance was not so
limited. Here the burden was on the state to show that it could
not accomplish its object by a less drastic method than requiring
all handbills to be so identified. Unlike the other cases the
Court did not indicate what the reasonable alternative was, but
established the principle that the state must show it could not
accomplish its object by a regulation rather than a prohibition
so as not to destroy legitimate rights of those whose conduct was
not related to the evil the state was trying to prevent.
An Arkansas statute requiring every teacher as a condition
of employment in state supported schools to file annually an
affidavit listing without limitation every organization to which
he belonged within the last five years fared no better in Shelton
v. Tucker.0 4 Requiring the listing of every organization was
held to be an interference with freedom of association as guar-
anteed by the due process clause. It was admitted that the state
could inquire into the fitness of its teachers and that their mem-
berships may have had some relevance to the fitness. The statute
was invalidated on the ground that it was not limited to the types
of organizations that could have relevance to the teacher's fitness.
The Court clearly articulated the principle of excessive regulation
as follows:
"In a series of decisions this court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridg-
ment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achiev-
ing the same basic purpose."'05 .
Again the state's failure to regulate with a view toward avoid-
ing infringement of rights was unconstitutional, since a a regula-
tion could have been drafted which would accomplish the state's
purpose without such interference.
Other situations where the Court indicated that at least one
basis for its decision was that the state could have accomplished
its purpose without destroying the rights of persons were Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,06 where it was observed that the state could
regulate private schools and set standards rather than prohibiting
104. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
105. 364 U.S. at 487-488.
106. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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them entirely;" 7 and Barnette v. Board of Edurcation,l08 where the
Court observed that the board could have taulght patriotism by
requiring courses in American history rather than by requiring
children to salute the flag against their religious beliefs. 109
There are basically two conditions in the area of actual segre-
gation. One is where the board could eliminate the harm entirely
by establishing an integrated school, but has not done so, even
though this could be accomplished without serious interference
with the operation of its school system (we are assuming there
is no policy of segregation) . The second situation is where there
is no choice but to operate the school as a segregated one due to
racial concentration, e.g., in the center of Harlem. We are as-
suming that to require the board to juggle the boundaries and
transport students great distances does not qualify as a reasonable
alternative to operating the school on a neighborhood basis
despite the fact that it causes feelings of inferiority and denies
the opportunity for contact. The question is to what extent must
the board take account of the harm done by actual segregation in
each instance.
This discussion may be commenced with a consideration of
Branche v. Board of Education of Hempstead."0 The case did
not fully explore the situation in that it arose on a motion for
summary judgement. Due to racial concentration in residential
patterns and the operation of the schools on a neighborhood
basis at least one school was attended almost exclusively by Ne-
groes, two others to a great degree and two schools were almost
exclusively white. In suit to enjoin the operation of racially
segregated schools and the denial of equal protection to the Negro
students the board moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the board did not have a policy of segregation and that it
"had no duty to integrate."
The court denied the motion, even though there was no evi-
107. The Court observed that there was no question as to the power of the state
to do this. But because it could do this did not give it the power to abolish private
education; rather it should employ those methods to accomplish its objective.
108. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
109. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v.
United Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957). The majority did not pass
on the question of whether Congress could prohibit labor unions from making
expenditures to political campaigns. The dissent did and found it unconstitutional
on the ground that Congress could prevent the evils of such contributions and'
protect the rights of dissenting members by regulation rather than by prohibition
of such contributions. Its failure to employ those alternatives, he contended, ren-
dered the statute unconstitutional. 352 U.S. at.596-597.
110. 204 F.Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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dence that the board maintained a policy of segregation. With
respect to that claim the court observed that:
"Defendants show facts compatible with an absence of responsi-
bility on their part for the racial segregation that exists in the
schools but these facts do not demonstrate that there has not been
segregation because of race. Segregated education is inadequate
and when that inadequacy is attributable to state action it is a
deprivation of constitutional right."''
More significantly the court recognized that the question was not
one of state action or private action causing the discrimination.
It recognized that the requisite state action was present in the
operation of the school system. To that extent the state was
causing feelings of inferiority when it required children to at-
tend school on a segregated basis due to the fact that the neigh-
borhood where they lived was segregated. The main thrust of
the opinion was that the state could not ignore the harm caused
by actual segregation if there was something it could do about it.
It stated:
"The educational system that is thus compulsory and publicly
afforded must deal with the inadequacy arising from adventitious
segregation; it cannot accept and indurate segregation on the
ground that it is not coerced or planned but accepted.
Failure to deal with a condition as really inflicts it as does any
grosser imposition of it. How far that duty extends is not answer-
able perhaps in terms of an unqualified obligation to integrate
public education without regard to circumstance and it is cer-
tainly primarily the responsibility of the educational authorities
and not the Courts to form the educational system .... The effort
to mitigate the consequent educational inadequacy has not been
made and to forego that effort to deal with the inadequacy is to
impose it in the absence of a conclusive demonstration that no
circumstantially possible effort can effect any significant mitiga-
tion" (citations omitted)."
2
The language of the court seems similar to that employed in
the reasonable alternative cases. The decision, despite its limited
effect due to the procedural posture of the case, is significant in
III. 204 F.Supp. at 153.
112. Ibid.
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that (1) it recognizes that the state is in effect causing feelings
of inferiority due to race and denying equal educational oppor-
tunities when schools are factually segregated despite the absence
of a policy of segregation (2) the state must make an effort to
mitigate the harmful consequences of segregation if this can
practicably be done.
It is submitted, therefore, that the action of school hoards must
be viewed in light of the constitutional principle of reasonable
alternative as embodied in the due process clause. Segregated
education occasioned by racial concentration without improper
motive is, from the standpoint of the minority child no less harm-
ful than that imposed by racist motivation. Admittedly the state
must be free to educate the child and to effectively operate its
school system. But if it can educate the child without causing
feelings of inferiority, but chooses a method, which, while educat-
ing him, causes such feelings its failure to adopt the reasonable
alternative offends due process. Applying this principle to the sit-
nation where the board could practicably educate the child on an
integrated basis, but has adopted a method of school attendance
which results in segregated education, it has acted unconstitu-
tionally. Earlier we considered the question of what constitutes
a neighborhood. In fringe areas we have seen that attendance
zones can often result in two segregated schools or two integrated
schools, depending on whether the board zones north and south
or east and west. No great inconvenience results from either
method of zoning. By adopting one method the board could
prevent feelings of inferiority due to race; by adopting the other
method it causes such feelings in the operation of its school sys-
tem. Both methods of zoning enable the state to educate the
child. Since it could accomplish its object without causing feel-
ings of inferiority, while not interfering with the operation of
its school system, its failure to choose the reasonable alternative
offends due -process.
The same is true with other action such .as seleciion of feeder
schools for high school districts, selection of a site for a new
school, tearing down an old school and the like. I1 one clhbice
would prevent actual segregation and at the same tifie not inter-
fere with the operation of the school system, there is no reason
why the board should not adopt that choice. Its failure to choose
the reasonable alternative is unreasonable in view of tme hiarmi
that the choice it has made causes to the Negro stni(lents, wiii
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harm could be easily eliminated. In other words, the reasonable-
ness of the board's action must be considered in light of the fact
that actual segregation harms the Negro students.
It is interesting to note that there is a body of state law in
regard to the reasonableness of the actions of a school board de-
spite the discretion vested in them. Division of attendance areas
by gerrymandering, causing some students to have to travel a
greater distance than others has been held unreasonable whether
or not the division was based on race."' Other unreasonable ac-
tions have included requiring a child to attend school a great
distance away from home and requiring him to cross a dangerous
place to attend;14 establishing a school district in a location
where many children could not attend regularly due to the con-
dition of the roads;" 5 constructing new facilities which were un-
necessary in relation to cost;" 6 transferring children from a dis-
trict with the result that the district would greatly have to in-
crease taxes to operate schools."' The principal of reasonableness
had been carried over into the due process clause even prior to
Brown and Bolling. Thus, in Westminster School District v.
Mendez, 8 it was held that acts of school district officials in segre-
gating childrer of Mexican descent violated due process in view
of fact that state law prohibited segregation. The board contended
that language deficiencies justified the segregation, but the court
found that they were not so widespread that they could not be
corrected by another method. This is another example of where
the failure to adopt a reasonable alternative was a factor in in-
validating the action.
The only change that has been proposed is the formal recog-
nition that the reasonableness of the board's action must be
viewed in light of the harm done to Negro children by actual
segregation. This test would be applicable to all board action.
For example, let us say that the board busses children in Negro
neighborhoods in order to relieve crowded classrooms. White
schools are nearby, but instead the board busses them to Negro
113. Myers v. Board of Supervisors of DeSoto County, 156 Miss. 251, 125 So. 718
(1930).
114. Alford v. Board of Education of Campbell County, 298 Ky. 803, 184 S.W.2d
207 (1944); In re Richards, 255 App.Div. 922, 7 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1938).
115. Packard v. Board of Commissioners of Otter Tail County, 174 Minn. 347,
219 N.W. 289 (1928).
116. Gennell v. Fox, 241 Pa. 146, 88 Atl. 426 (1913).
117. State v. Allen, 55 Wash. 2d 766, 350 P.2d 465 (1960).
118. 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
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schools at a great distance.1" The failure to choose the reagonable
alternative, which would have accomplished the board's purpose
of educating the children, but not have caused the feelings of
inferiority nor denied them contact with white children is un-
reasonable and in violation of due process. Another example
might be bussing Negro children to white schools to relieve over-
crowdedness, but setting up the schedule so that they have no op-
portunity to be in contact with white children. The failure to
provide such contact, which involves no inconvenience to the
operation of the school system, is unreasonable, since the provid-
ing of this contract could have eliminated the inequality and
feelings of inferiority that result from segregated education while
at the same time not interfering with the state's accomplishment
of its educational objective.
We may now consider what objections may be made to the're-
quirement of the board's acting with a view toward choosing the
alternative which will prevent the feelings of inferiority caused
by actual segregation. The first may be that the board would have
to prevent ethnic concentration, that is, it would have to choose
aliernatives preventing concentrations of Italian or Jewish or
Irish or Polish students, which would make operation of an effec-
tive school system impossible. The answer is that there is no
evidence that other groups suffer feelings of inferiority or are
denied equal educational opportunities due to their ethnic con-
centration. The efforts have been primarily to keep Negroes seg-
regated from whites more so than to keep other- ethnic groups
separated from the dominant ones. This was recognized by the
court in New Rochelle, which pointed out that "Brown was based
on factual findings which may not be applicable to other minority
groups."1 20 If there was any evidence that other groups suffered
feelings of inferiority from being segregated due to ethnic com-
position, the same principles would come into play. In New
York, for example, the Brown principles are probably applicable
to the Puerto Ricans. The point is that the discrimination due
to race has been directed against the Negro as it has not been
against any other group. Therefore, the Court found that Ne-
groes suffer feelings of inferiority due to being required to at-
tend school only with members of their own race. The board
cannot excuse its failure to consider the situation of the Negro
by saying it is not considering the situations of other groups, as
119. See 1961 Education, supra, note 5 at 106.
120. 191 F.Supp. at 196.
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to which there is no evidence that they are similarly due to segre-
gation as is the Negro.
The second objection is that the "Constitution is color-blind."
This represents a glib generalization and like most glib gen-
eralizations is inaccurate. As Judge Kaufman pointed out, "The
Constitution is not this color-blind.' 121 The guarantee of equal
protection is that a person shall not be denied a benefit because
of his race or made to suffer feeling of inferiority due to race as
aresult of action by the state. Where race has been used to
justify a denial of rights to a person because of his race, then
it may be said that the Constitution is "color-blind." Even there,
the Constitution is not color-blind, where the denial of benefits
due to race is necessary to accomplish a legitimate governmental
objective. Thus, due to military necessity the government was
permitted to require Americans of Japanese ancestory to be re-
located en masse.
22
On the other hand where failure to consider differences in
needs. due to race results ininjury to the minority race, putting,
•it-at a disadvantage with the majority race, the failure to consider
race becomes unreasonable. Because of constant discrimination
minority groups have different problems. This was recognized..:
in Meredith v. Fair,23 in considering a requirement of the Uni-
versity of Mississippi that each candidate for admission furnish
certificates from alumni that he was of good moral character. The
court held that the requirement denied equal protection to Negro
students, as they would find great difficulty in obtaining such cer-
tificates due to their race. The court was most "color-conscious"
in observing as follows:
"We hold that the University's requirement that each candidate
for admission furnish alumni certificates is a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws in its application to Negro candidates. It is a
heavy burden on qualified Negro students because of their race.
It is no burden on qualified white students.
The fact that there are no Negro alumni of the University of
Mississippi, the manifest unlikelihood of their being more than
a handful of alumni, if any, who would recommend a Negro for
the University, the traditional social barriers making it unlikely,
if not impossible for a Negro to approach alumni with a request
121. Ibid.
122. Korematu v. t nitcd Statcs, 323 U.S. 214 (1914).
21. 2-9S r,2d 696 (th Cir. 1962).
SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN THE NOR/li /IND WEST 267
for a recommendation, the possibility of ICpi i'%a k if alumni should
recommend a Negro for admission, are bariiers only to qualified
Negro applicants."'
24
The court clearly recognized the effects of discrimination as justi-
fying its being color-conscious.
The courts have constantly-recognized such differences in needs
as a result of discrimination. In Sweatt v. JPainter, 25 the Court
emphasized that most of the lawyers and judges in the state were
white, justifying the Negro's need for contact with white lawyers,
even though white lawyers did not need such contact with Negro
lawyers. Similarly in Lane v. Wilson,"' the Court voided a stat-
ute which gave persons who had not previously been eligible to
vote (previous eligibility was based on the unconstitutional
grandfather clause) about 'twelve days to register or be disen-
franchised. It observed that "the restrictions imposed must be
judged with reference to those for whom they were designed" and
that "we are dealing with a body of citizens lacking the habits and
traditions of political independence and otherwise living in cir-
cumstances which do not encourage initiative and enterprise."
1 27
It has also been suggested that trusts in which the state is involved
should be validated, though exclusively for the benefit of Negroes.
As Professor Clark has observed:
"Classification by race is altogether different in psychological
origin and effect from other methods of classifying beneficiaries.
It is designed to hurt, not to benefit, and sociologists tell us that
such is the effect. The malevolence of racial selection is the anti-
thesis of charity, and therein might be found the basis for a legal
distinction. But such an approach encounters the difficulties
which fostered the traditional rule of restraint. Should a trust
for the exclusive benefit of Negroes, for example, be distinguished
from other types of racial selection? It can be argued that the
second-class status which has been forced on the Negro by the
dominant white majority provides an affirmative reason for such.
a classification."' 28
124. 298 F.2d at 701-702. Accord both as to holding and reasoning: Hunt v.
Arnold, 172 F.Supp. 847 (N.D.Ga. 1959).
125. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
126. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
127. Id. at 272.
128. Clark, Charitable Trusts,' the Fourteenth Amendment and the Hill of
Stephen Girard, 66 Yale L.J. 979, 1001 (1957). However, he doubted whether the
court would draw a distinction.
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The Courts have clearly recognized that the Negro has different
needs due to the years of discrimination, both private and public.
Therefore, it is no answer to say that the board cannot be re-
quired to choose the reasonable alternative preventing feelings
of inferiority due to race, because "the Constitution is color-
blind." A more accurate slogan if one is needed, would be that
"the Constitution is color-blind when discrimination is practiced
against persons because of their race, but color-conscious when
persons have special needs as a result of discrimination due to
their race."
Where the board has failed to choose the reasonable alterna-
tive, the remedy is not, of course, to enjoin the operation of
the schools, but to require the board to take the reasonable alter-
native. When the court finds that the board could have prevented
segregation by zoning differently, then the remedy is a man-
datory injunction ordering the board to rezone in accordance
with that alternative. The means of performance are left to the
board's discretion, so long as the net result is that the schools are
integrated; note that previously this will have been found to be
practicable. The same is true with feeder districts; the board can
choose -whatever particular districts it wishes to assign to each
school so long as the effect is that not all the Negro feeder districts
are assigned to one school and all the white districts to another;
again, it will have previously been found a mixture is possible.
Now we shall consider the situation where there is no question
of integrating the schools as a reasonable alternative, that is, that
racial concentration is such in relationship to the available
schools, that the board could not achieve an integrated school
without seriously disrupting the operation of its school system.
The due process and equal protection clauses cannot be said to
require the state to seriously disrupt the operation of its school
system, transporting pupils at great distance and the like, in order
to achieve actual integration. However, a reasonable alternative
in such a situation would be to permit the child who so desired
to transfer to an integrated school to the extent such facilities
were available.
In this connection it must be remembered that we are dealing
with the substantive right of an individual child to have equal
educational opportunities and not the rights, of Negro children
as a class. The fact that many of the desegregation suits are in-
stituted as class actions should not obscure this fact. It is also no
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answer for the board to say that if it permits one child to trans-
fer, it must permit all Negro children to do so with the resulting
disruption of the school system. The simple fact is that not all
children will want to transfer.
This was emphasized by the court in Evans v. Ennis,1 9 where
the board was ordered to speed up integration despite a claim that
this would result in overcrowded schools. The court observed that
it was "common knowldege that a large number of Negro children
do not seek integration even when offered the opportunity." The
same rationale is applicable in regard to transfers from a school
where actual segregation is unavoidable. To the extent facilities in
other schools are available, those children who wish to transfer
must be granted the opportunity to do so in order that they not
suffer educational disadvantage. The reasonable alternative of
permitting transfers where feasible must be employed, since the re-
sult will be that the state educates the child on an integrated basis
while at the same time not seriously disrupting the operation of
its school system. It would be a defense that it was not feasible to
permit the particular transfer either because of the overcrowding
of other schools or because of the excessive distance involved.
Moreover, there would be no requirement that the state bear the
cost of transportation to the integrated school. The remedy in
such a case is a mandatory injunction ordering the board to indi-
cate a school to which the child can transfer and pennit such trans-
fer, once it has been demonstrated that facilities are available at
other schools. The conditions of the decree in the New Rochelle
case could serve as a model.
Finally let us consider the situation where there is no question
of a reasonable alternative even by way of transfer. The due proc-
ess clause cannot be said to require either the abandoning of the
attempt to educate the child or the disruption of the school system
in order to prevent the feelings of inferiority the child gets from
actual segregation. However, this does not mean that the state can
ignore the harmful condition which it has created in its efforts to
educate the child. It must attempt to mitigate the harm that its
need to educate the child and employment of the neighborhood
school system in doing so has caused. This was recognized by the
court in Hempstead when it talked of the need to "make the effort
to mitigate the consequent educational inadequacy. '"1 30 The state
129. 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1960).
130. 204 F.Supp. at 153.
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must try to eliminate the harm it has caused in the carrying out of
a function when it is practicable to require it to do so. This.stetns
from the same source as the requirement to employ the reasonable
alternative.
Moreover, an analogy may be drawn to the state's power to coni-
trol a situation as relative to what constitutes state action. In a
number of situations where the action of private persons has been
deemed to be state action, it was because the state could have pre-
vented the harm without the exercise of its police power, but did
not do so. One class of cases is where the state has abandoned
control of an activity which it has the power to control in the
exercise of its governmental functions. In such a situation the
action of the private persons who have taken over the function is
the action of the state. This has been applied to its abandonment
of control over elections 3 ' and the public streets. 32 The other
class of cases has been where the state has leased public facilities
to private operators, but has not prevented them from discrimi-
nating. Then the action of the private persons has been deemed
to be that of the state, since the state-without need for exercise of
its policy power-could have prevented the harm but did not.
This has. been applied to leases in a parking garage, 33 a county
courthouse, 3 4 an air terminal,'135 a golf course 36 and a city owned
building used as a theater. 3 7 As the Supreme Court has stated:
"As the Chancellor pointed out, in its lease with Eagle the
Authority coula have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge
the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed
upon the private enterprise as a consequence of state participa-
tion. But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by
either ignoring them or by failing to discharge them whatever the
motive may be. It is of no consequence to an individual denied the
equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith."'
13 8
131. See discussion, supra, note 11 and accompanying text.
132. See discussion, supra, note 12 and accompanying text.
133. Burton v. Wilnington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
134. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956) cert.denied, 353 U.S.
924 (1957).
135. Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F.Supp. 579 (N.D.Ga. 1960). It was immaterial
that under the terms of the contract the city had no right to control the lessee.
136. City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957).
137. Jones v. Marva Theaters, 180 F.Supp. 49 (D.Md. 1960).
138. 365 U.S. at 775. If the state in good faith disposes of the facility, however,
the buyer can discriminate, as the state has abandoned its power to control. Tom-
kins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960).
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These principles are more strongly applicable where the state
has caused the harm itself rather than permitted private persons
tP do so. Granted that the state had no choice but to require the
child to attend a segregated school, as otherwise thc sclhool system
could not be effectively operated. But having put die child in a
position to suffer such feelings, due process and equal protection
also require the state to do something to prevent the o :(tirrence of
such feelings or at least to mitigate their harmful effects. Since the
state has to educate the child on a segregated basis due to racial
composition of the neighborhood, it must take action to indicate
to the child that he i5 not limited to contacts with Negroes in the
educative process. Therefore, it must take some action to put him
into contact with white students in the process, though it is not
required to integrate the schools.
The matter can best be accomplished by what is called an ex-
perimental decree.3 9 This is what was employed in the Brown
case. In such a situation the court declares the rights of the parties,
orders the defendant to take action to eliminate the harm and
leaves the means of performance to the discretion of the defend-
ant. As long as he acts in good faith, he will not be held in con-
tempt. The court retains jurisdiction until it is satisfied that the
harm has been eliminated. The board is not required to do any
particular thing; it can do many. It can see to it for example, that
the children at segregated Negro schools have the opportunity to
participate in athletic competition with white schools, or have
joint assemblies periodically or sponsor social events, or any
method it chooses to mitigate the feelings of inferiority that are
caused by segregated education. The important thing is that the
board furnish the opportunity for substantial contact with chil-
dren of a different race in the operation of its educational system.
Enforced Integration
Thus far we have been considering the situation where the
school board is maintaining actual segregation in the operation of
its educational system. Now let us examine the .opposite choice.
Suppose a school board is convinced that Negro children, or both
white and Negro children, must attend school on an integrated
basis in order to achieve a completely satisfactory educational ex-
perience. Rather than taking advantage of or ignoring adven-
139. See generally, Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief,
16 Rutgers L. Rev. 639, 716 (1962).
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titious segregation due to racial concentration, the board chooses
to eliminate it in the schools. The question arises as to whether
there are any constitutional issues raised by its choice of certain
methods to achieve this result.
The first situation is where a board permits Negro students to
transfer to all-white schools, but does not allow white children
transfer privileges (it is doubtful if the request of a white child to
transfer to an all-Negro school would be denied if it should ever
occur). Can the board constitutionally give Negro children the
opportunity to transfer while denying the same opportunity to
white children, or is this a denial of equal protection to the latter?
In New Rochelle, the dissenting judge argued that the transfer
provisions violated equal protection, since a Jewish or Italian
child or the like did not have the right to transfer even if a given
district was predominantly Jewish or Italian.140 It has also been
contended that a white child is denied equal protection if he is
required to attend school with a Negro child against his will, as
he might suffer feelings of inferiority as a result.14, Is it justifiable
then for the board to permit only Negroes to trarister?
The answer is, as Judge Kaufman pointed out in New Rochelle,
that the Brown decision found that the Negro suffered feelings of
inferiority as a result of segregation. He then needs to be relieved
against the segregated learning situation. There is no evidence
that the white child or children of most other ethnic groups (ex-
ceptions would be Puerto Ricans in New York, Mexicans in the
southwest, and American Indians in some areas) suffer any feel-
ings of inferiority due to his race. As a result they have no need
to transfer, but the Negro child has such a need.
It is well settled that a state does not deny equal protection by
giving a benefit to a group that needs it while denying the same
benefit to another group that does not. Thus, it is constitutional
for a state to provide that cooperatives are exempted from the
anti-trust law and to punish an attempt to. induce persons to break
contracts with cooperatives, though inducing persons to break
other contracts is not punishable. 4 2 The court noted that co-
operatives were necessary to satisfy the special needs of agricultural
producers and that cooperatives particularly needed protection of
140. 294 F.2d at 50.
141. Borders v. Rippey, 188 F. Supp. 231, 232 (N.D.Tex. 1960). rev'd.sub norn.
Boson v. Rippey, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960).
142. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-operative Marketing
Assoc., 276 U.S. 69 (1928).
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the kind granted. By the same token the state can also exempt
agricultural products or livestock from the operation of the anti-
trust laws. 43 As Justice Frankfurter observed:
"These various measures are manifestations of the fact that in
our national economy agriculture expresses functions and forces
different from the other elements in the total economic process.
Certainly these are differences which may be acted upon by the
lawmakers. The equality at which the equal protection clause
aims is not disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment
enjoins the 'equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not ab-
stract propositions. They do not relate to abstract units, B and
C., but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties,
addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific
remedies. The Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as if they were
the same." (emphasis added).
144
This observation is particularly apt in regard to transfeir provi-
sions for white and Negro students in the situation described,
since there the Negroes are the ones who suffer feelings of inferi-
ority due to segregation by race.
Moreover, classifications to protect constitutional rights are not
- unreasonable. Thus, in Packer Corp. v. Utah,'145 a statute forbid-
ding the advertising of tobacco on billboards and streetcars, but
inapplicable to newspapers and periodicals, the latter prohibition
having been held to be in violation of the interstate commerce
clause, did not violate equal protection as applied to a billboard
advertiser. The Court observed that "action taken by a State to
observe one prohibition of the Constitution does not entail the
violation of another." Here, transfers are granted to Negroes only
so that the state will not cause them to suffer feelings of inferiority
due to race. As the white children suffer no such feelings of in-
feriority, the state may give transfer privileges to the Negro chil-
dren without giving them to the whites.
The second interesting problem arises if the state should at-
tempt to achieve a fully integrated school system by limiting the
percentage of Negro and white children that can attend a given
school. It establishes a quota system for each race at a particular
school, designed to insure racial balance. A Negro student seeks
143. Tignor v. Texas, 310 U.S. 132 (1940).
144. Id. at 146-147.
145. 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
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transfer to another school having its quota of Negroes and is de-
nied admission because of his race. The question arises as to
whether the board has acted unconstitutionally in denying him
admission to the particular school because of his race.
In the first place, the question presented is unlike that involved
in the benign quotas in housing. There the Negro is denied a
benefit because of his race, and it can well be contended that it is
really of no consolation to him that the purpose is to benefit his
race generally. On that basis judicial enforcement of such restric-
tions have been said to constitute a denial of equal protection.146
Here the question is not one of the "benefits" or pre-Brown aspect
of equal protection. Rather it is one of suffering feelings of in-
feriority due to race.
And this furnishes the answer to the question. It has been often
stated that Brown holds a child cannot be denied admission to a
school because of his race. But this is another generalization. This
has been applied when a child seeks admission to a white school
from a Negro school. Since the state cannot cause feelings of in-
feriority due to race, it cannot enforce a policy of segregation, and
hence cannot deny a child admission to a school on the ground
that it is to be attended by members of another race. This reason-
ing is inapplicable when the child is attending an integrated
school. Since lhe is attending an integrated school, the state is not
causing him to suffer feelings of inferiority due to race. Its de-
cision that he shall attend a particular integrated school and that
all schools shall be integra-ted in certain proportions represents an
effort by the state to give the child a meaningful educational ex-
perience. It can insist that he attend school with white children
and prevent the situation where a school becomes factually segre-
gated because of the presence of too great a proportion of one
race. Therefore, the state is not denying him equal protection,
even though he is denied admission to a particular school because
of race.14 7
146. Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F.Supp. 681 (N.D.ll. 1960).
The case involved a suit to enjoin a conspiracy to condemn the developer's land,
which was to be used for an integrated development. The court held that the in-
junction would not lie, because of the benign quota provisions in the contracts. On
appeal this was reversed on the ground that the complaint stated a cause of action
against the state officials, even if the developer could not judicially enforce the be-
nign quotas. 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
147. As the court observed in Kelley v. Board of Education of Nashville, 270
F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959) cert.denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959), "It is the denial of the
right to attend g non-segregated school that violates the child's constitutional
rights." Supra, at 229 (emphasis added).
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Conclusion
The legal problems resulting from actual scg1"cg Irion in the
north and west can be grouped into three categoi ics: (1) unequal
facilities; (2) policy of segregation; and (3) scgrc<gation due to
racial concentration in the absence of a policy (1 segregation.
Each involves different considerations and dillc'ciit remedies.
Where facilities are unequal in respect to natt:s siuwli as curricu-
lum or teacher qualifications and this can be eliiiiatcd by the
board, there has been a denial of equal protection i Mspective of
any question of race. The board may not constittiMtoally main-
tain a policy of segregation either in the operation of a particular
school or the school system, nor may it make decisions with the
intention to discriminate because of race. Finally the board must
act reasonably to either prevent segregation if actual segregation
is unavoidable. The test of reasonable alternative, as embodied in
the due process clause, if accepted, will ensure that segregation
does not exist where it could be eliminated without interference
with the operation of the school system.
Finally, it must be remembered that the state is acting by oper-
ating a public school system and/or requiring attendance therein.
In such operation it is subject to the requirements of equal pro-
tection and due -process and cannot effectively maintain segrega-
tion merely because private arrangements have resulted in segre-
gated residential neighborhoods.
